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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20000889-CA 
vs. 
TARA KAY MAST, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction of theft by receiving stolen property, a 
third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-408 (1999), in the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Roger A. Livingston, 
presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did defendant admit responsibility for criminal conduct beyond the offense 
of conviction, and did the trial court properly order restitution based on that 
admission? 
Sentencing decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. "We will not 
vacate an order of restitution unless the trial court abused its discretion or exceeded 
its authority. However, if the trial court's order is premised on statutory 
interpretation . . . we afford the trial court's interpretation no deference and review 
for correctness." State v. Dominguez, 1999 UT App 343, | 6 , 992 P.2d 995 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). Whether a defendant's admissions 
sufficiently establish the criminal responsibility to support a restitution order is a 
question of law. See State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, | 5 , 987 P.2d 1289; cf. 
State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 937-38 (Utah 1998) 
2. Did the trial court's restitution order violate defendant's due process 
rights? 
Whether the trial court's restitution order violated defendant's due process 
rights is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 
924, 927 (reviewing due process challenge of eyewitness's identification). 
3. In the event resentencing is required, may the court, in its discretion, 
reinstate the fine and recoupment fee suspended to facilitate payment of the original 
restitution order? May the sentencing court order restitution for lost wages for time 
the victim spent with the police, in court, and at his bank? 
Whether the court has discretion to reinstate the fine and recoupment is a 
question of law reviewable for correctness. See State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179 
(Utah 1981). The lost wages issue is a question of statutory interpretation reviewed 
for correctness. See Dominguez, 1999 UT App 343 at f 6. 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
included in Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201 (1999); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-408 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS1 
Victim Curtis Belnap was defendant's former boyfriend. R. 17. They had 
known one another since meeting in Odyssey House, an alcohol and drug 
rehabilitation program, approximately ten years earlier. See R. 17, 37; PSI at 3, 8. 
Defendant came to see the victim when she was having marital difficulties in 1999. 
PSI at 3. He "let her into [his] house and was a friend to her." Id. She knew 
"exactly where to find things in [his] house." Id. 
On February 3, 2000, Belnap's home was burglarized. Among the items 
taken were checks, four men's rings, a gold pocket watch, a large water bottle 
containing approximately $3500 in cash, two stereo speakers, and a day planner. 
PSI at 2, 4. Later that day, defendant was apprehended presenting one of Belnap's 
stolen checks to purchase items at a Salt Lake County Target store. PSI at 2. 
The "Official Version of Offense," included in the Pre-Sentence Investigation 
Report, details what happened after police were called. During questioning by a 
1
 Except as otherwise annotated, the facts recited here are taken from the Pre-
Sentence Investigative Report. 
3 
police officer, defendant said that she needed to use the restroom and asked to 
retrieve a feminine pad from her purse. The officer said he would retrieve it for her 
and asked where it was. She pointed to a small black pouch. When the officer 
picked it up, defendant quickly grabbed it. The officer stated that he needed to 
check the contents. After some hesitation, defendant gave it to him. Inside the 
pouch he found four men's rings and a pocket watch. PSI at 2. When asked whose 
they were, defendant said that they were hers. Id. Belnap was later contacted. He 
described the items and reported they were taken from his home during the burglary 
the same day defendant was arrested. Id. 
After being advised of her Miranda rights, defendant claimed that a male 
friend had given her the checks and the jewelry, but that she could not remember his 
name or provide a description of him. Id. She recounted that this male friend had 
been with her at the store, but had left, telling her to pay for the items with one of 
the checks he had given her. Id. Defendant stated that she knew the checks were 
stolen. She said she knew Belnap, but denied any knowledge of the burglary earlier 
that day. Id. 
Defendant was charged with one count of forgery and one count of theft by 
receiving stolen property. R. 2. She pled guilty to theft by receiving stolen 
property, and the forgery count was dismissed. R. 23. She was sentenced to an 
indeterminate prison term not to exceed five years, fined $1000, and assessed $200 
4 
for recoupment of attorneys' fees. R. 45-46; 70:13. Despite defense counsel's 
objections, the court ordered her to pay $5,090 in restitution. R. 70:8-9. This figure 
represented $40 for replacement of stolen checks; $400 for lost wages for time the 
victim spent with the police, courts, and bank; and $4650 for certain items taken in 
the burglary—$3500 cash, stereo speakers valued at $1100, and a $50 day planner. 
See PSI at 4. 
The judge then suspended the prison term, but imposed a 180-day jail term. 
He "suspended] payment of the fine and . . . fees recoupment, assuming that 
[defendant was] going to pay restitution in an amount greater than—than those 
amounts." R. 70:13-14; see also R. 71:3 ("I suspended—was it $1000 for the 
fine . . . . [in] anticipation of [defendant's] paying the $5000 in restitution"); 
R. 71:13 ("as a practical matter, it's going to be impossible for you to pay a fine as 
well as the restitution and it's more important that the restitution get paid"). 
Restitution was discussed at sentencing and at a hearing on defendant's 
motion to amend or alter judgment. R. 70, 71. Defense counsel argued that 
defendant had not admitted to participating in the burglary and therefore could not 
be ordered to pay restitution for the items taken in the burglary. See R. 70:9; 
71:8-9. 
Based on his reading of the presentence report and his questioning of 
defendant, the trial judge found that defendant had "participated] in a criminal 
5 
activity resulting in [the] economic loss . . . ordered by this Court." R. 71:13. He 
found defendant's story of how she acquired the stolen items "simply unreasonable 
and unbelievable." Id. He found that she was "disingenuous, if not dishonest," had 
"misrepresented] the facts," and was apparently "flat-out untruthful." R. 71:10-11. 
He found it "farcical and whimsical to believe for a moment that someone she 
[didn't] even know well enough to know his name" or "even describe him" gave her 
valuable jewelry "just for the flm of it." R. 71:11-12. 
When the sentencing judge rehearsed defendant's story and then asked her 
whether it sounded plausible, defendant admitted that it was "pretty far-fetched." 
R. 70:12. When she insisted that she didn't know who committed the burglary, but 
that her boyfriend, "Braden, . . . had nothing to do with this," the judge asked "How 
do you know that? If you don't know who did it, then you wouldn't know that he 
didn't do it." R. 70:12-13. Defendant conceded "Well, okay." R. 70:13. 
Defendant then returned to her earlier claim that she "[didn't] know." Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant admitted lying about her receipt of stolen goods. By admitting 
to the lie, she admitted responsibility for criminal conduct, i.e., concealing or aiding 
in concealing stolen property. Defendant's admitted criminal conduct is causally 
related to the victim's damages and supports the restitution order. 
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2. Application of the restitution statute does not violate due process. The 
court's restitution order was supported by defendant's plea and by her admissions to 
additional criminal conduct. Defendant had an opportunity to be heard regarding 
the scope of her responsibility for damages occasioned by her conviction and by the 
criminal conduct to which she admitted. 
3. Should this court require resentencing, it should instruct that fines 
suspended to facilitate payment of the original restitution order may be reinstated 
and clarify that restitution may be ordered for the victim's lost wages. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The court properly ordered restitution based on defendant's 
admitted criminal conduct. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ordering restitution for items 
taken in the burglary, but not in defendant's possession at the time of arrest. Br. 
Aplt. at 9-12. Defendant asserts that she cannot be held responsible for the losses 
occasioned by the burglary because she did not admit participating in it. Id. at 12-
13. 
In Utah and in most other jurisdictions, a defendant convicted of receiving 
stolen goods cannot, on that basis alone, be required to pay restitution for damages 
caused by a related burglary—e.g., for stolen property other than the property 
received. See, e.g., J MM. v. State (In re J MM.), 924 P.2d 895, 896-97 (Utah App. 
7 
1996) (applying juvenile restitution statute, but observing that analysis was 
comparable to discussions in criminal restitution context); Commonwealth v. Reed, 
543 A.2d 587, 589 (Pa. Super. 1988). In the absence of evidence or an admission 
linking a defendant to the related burglary, no basis exists for holding the defendant 
responsible for the damages it caused. See In re J.M.H., 924 P.2d at 897; see also 
State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah App. 1993) (stating that "restitution 
should be ordered only in cases where liability is clear as a matter of law and where 
commission of the crime establishes causality of the injury or damages"). 
In this case, however, defendant did more than receive stolen property. She 
told the police that she had been at Target with the male friend who gave her the 
jewelry and checks, but that she could not remember his name or describe him. PSI 
at 2. She recounted this story to the sentencing judge, but then conceded that her 
story was "far-fetched." R. 70:12. She thus lied about the circumstances 
surrounding her receipt of stolen property. Her lies helped conceal other property 
stolen in the burglary and hindered the apprehension of the burglars. This conduct 
is criminal. It provides a proper basis for holding defendant responsible for the 
burglary damages. 
Utah law mandates restitution for criminal activities which include, in addition 
to offenses for which a defendant is convicted, other criminal conduct for which a 
defendant admits responsibility—with or without an admission of committing the 
8 
criminal conduct. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201 (1999) details the controlling 
provisions. The statute first defines "criminal activities" as used in the section: 
"Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
Id. at § 76-3-201(1 )(b) (emphasis added). It then articulates the restitution 
requirement: 
When a person is convicted of a criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court 
shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims of crime . . . . 
§ 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i). Finally, the statute reiterates that the court must include 
admitted criminal conduct when it determines restitution: 
For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the 
offense shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to 
the sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay 
restitution. . . . 
§ 76-3-20l(8)(a) (emphasis added). 
Under these provisions, a court must order restitution not only for damages 
occasioned by the offense of conviction, but also for damages occasioned by any 
criminal conduct for which a defendant admits responsibility. A defendant need not 
admit to committing the criminal conduct, merely responsibility for it. 
Defendant was convicted of receiving stolen property; more significantly for 
purposes of this appeal, defendant also admitted responsibility for criminal conduct. 
9 
She conceded that the story that she told the police at the time of her arrest and that 
she later recounted to the court was "far-fetched." While defendant did not candidly 
state that she lied, her concession to having told a "far-fetched" story is an 
admission, by way of euphemistic language, to lying. Her false statements 
concerned the circumstances under which she received the stolen goods in her 
possession. She may, indeed, have lied about her personal participation in the 
burglary; but, at the very least, she lied about her knowledge of the person from 
whom she received the stolen goods. By so lying, she aided in the concealment of 
stolen property, a violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-409 (1999) and a criminal 
offense causally related to the victim's losses.2 
The statute outlines the elements of this offense: "A person commits theft if 
[she] . . . conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding . . . property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, 
intending to deprive the owner of it." Id. at § 76-6-408(1). The term "conceal" 
should not be "interpreted in a technical sense, but rather includes all acts done 
which render the discovery or identification of the stolen property more difficult." 
State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 232 n.6 (Utah 1980). A defendant who falsely states 
2It is not clear whether the trial court considered defendant's concealing acts 
evidence of her participation in the burglary or of a separate criminal act. This court may 
affirm the trial court's decision, however, "if it is sustainable on any legal ground . . . 
even [if different] from that stated by the trial court." State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, 
[^12 n.6, 12 P.3d 110 (citation omitted). 
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that she does not know some information relevant to a theft aids in the concealment 
of stolen property, thereby violating the statute. See id. at 231-32 & n.5. 
Defendant here falsely stated that she did not know and could not describe the 
person from whom she received the stolen goods. She thereby gave false 
information relevant to the theft, aiding in concealing stolen property. 
Further, a causal relationship exists between defendant's admitted criminal 
offense and the losses suffered by the burglary victim. Defendant's lies regarding 
the circumstances under which she received the jewelry and checks "aided in 
concealing" the other property taken in the burglary. Had she told the truth, the 
property may have been recovered. Further, her lies hindered police efforts to 
apprehend the burglars. Had they been apprehended and convicted, the court could 
have required restitution from them. Defendant's lies helped close this avenue for 
recovering the victim's losses. 
While it is not absolutely certain that, absent defendant's criminal conduct, the 
stolen property would have been recovered or the burglars discovered, convicted, 
and ordered to pay restitution, the causal relationship between defendant's criminal 
conduct and the victim's pecuniary damages was sufficient to support the restitution 
order. Cf. State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539 (Utah App. 1997) (finding causal 
connection between defendant's conviction of joyriding and victim's loss when car 
was impounded and then sold); State ex rel Juvenile Dep 7 v. Dickerson, 784 P.2d 
11 
1121, 1122 (Or. App. 1990) (stating, in interpreting the Oregon statute after which 
Utah's is patterned,3 that the three prerequisites for an award of restitution are 
criminal activity, pecuniary damages, and "a causal relationship between the two").4 
It is similarly not certain that, "but for" the receipt of stolen goods, goods taken in a 
burglary will be recovered. Nevertheless, this Court has previously held that the 
causal link between the receipt of stolen goods and the victim's losses is sufficient 
to support a restitution award. In re J.M.H., 924 P.2d at 897 (finding, in analysis of 
juvenile restitution statute, causal link between receipt of stolen property and 
damages to victim). Concealing stolen goods, like receiving stolen goods, 
contributes directly to the victim's loss, thereby supporting the restitution award. 
See Kelley v. State, 720 So. 2d 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding trial 
court's restitution order on basis that "chop shop" operator, who received, concealed 
and altered stolen goods, "caused" victim's losses even without evidence of his 
actual involvement in theft). 
3See State v. Depaoli, 835 P.2d 162, 163 (Utah 1992) (stating that Utah's statute is 
"nearly identical to an Oregon statute from which it was patterned"); see also State v. 
Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App. 1992). 
4This case is distinguishable from State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, 987 P.2d 
1289, cited by defendant. In that case, the court addressed the propriety of a restitution 
order for costs of counseling incurred by a murder victim's family. Defendant in that 
case pled guilty to attempted obstruction of justice for having sold a car used in a murder, 
but did not admit responsibility for the murder. The court held that Watson could not be 
required to pay restitution on the basis of her conviction for attempted obstruction of 
justice because it did not result in any pecuniary damages. Id. at f 5. 
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Furthermore, this court has held it appropriate for a trial court to consider 
rehabilitative and deterrent purposes and to order restitution to prevent injustice. 
See State v. Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App. 1992). An award of 
restitution would prevent injustice in the instant case. 
In sum, defendant admitted telling a "far-fetched" story falsely accounting for 
her knowledge of the person from whom she received the pocket watch, jewelry, 
and checks. By admitting to this prevarication, defendant admitted criminal 
conduct, i.e., aiding in the concealment of the additional stolen property. This 
criminal conduct was causally related to the victim's losses. The restitution order 
encompassing all of the victim's losses from the burglary was therefore proper on 
the basis of defendant's admitted criminal conduct. The restitution order was also 
just. 
Point II 
Application of the restitution statute does not violate due process. 
Defendant argues that the restitution order in this case violates defendant's 
due process rights because she did not admit responsibility for the related burglary 
and was not charged with or convicted of the burglary. Br. Aplt. at 18. She argues 
that the restitution order therefore deprives her of her property without an 
opportunity to be heard. Id. at 20. 
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The restitution order in this case is supported by defendant's admission to 
criminal conduct causally related to the victim's pecuniary damages. Defendant 
admitted to the sentencing judge that her account of her receipt of the jewelry and 
checks was "far-fetched." She thereby admitted to falsely stating that she did not 
know information relevant to the burglary. This was an admission of responsibility 
for criminal conduct, i.e., concealing or aiding in the concealment of stolen 
property. Defendant had a full opportunity to be heard on the issue of her criminal 
responsibility and the scope of restitution. She did not suffer a deprivation of her 
due process rights. 
"[D]ue process requires criminal proceedings including sentencing to be based 
upon accurate and reasonably reliable information." State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 
273, f 8, 12 P.3d 110. A defendant has the right to notice and "the opportunity to be 
fully heard." State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 982 (discussing appropriateness of 
restitution order). 
Due process further requires that a restitution order, which deprives a 
defendant of his property, be based on either evidence or admission of criminal 
conduct from which "to place upon [the defendant] the responsibility for [the] 
damage." In re Schroeder, 598 P.2d 373, 374 (Utah 1979) (analyzing juvenile 
statute that pre-dated current version of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201). Further, due 
process demands that the criminal conduct admitted or proven have a clear causal 
14 
relationship with the damages for which restitution is awarded. Robinson, 860 P.2d 
at 983. 
Defendant here had an opportunity to respond and defend. She pled guilty to 
receiving stolen property. At sentencing, she admitted responsibility for lying 
which, in the context of this case, was an admission to responsibility for concealing 
stolen property. Both at sentencing and at the restitution rehearing, she had an 
opportunity to address the appropriate scope of restitution. 
Defendant's admission sufficed to meet the requirements of due process. She 
admitted to criminal conduct. That criminal conduct was causally related not just to 
the victim's loss of the jewelry and checks, but to his loss of all the property taken 
in the burglary. 
In sum, defendant suffered no deprivation of due process. She had an 
opportunity to be heard and defend. She admitted criminal conduct. Because her 
admitted criminal conduct was causally related to the losses for which restitution 
was ordered, the restitution order did not violate the demands of due process. 
Point III 
Should this court find the restitution order improper, it should clarify the 
permissibility of reinstating fines and the proper scope of a restitution order. 
Should the court determine that the restitution order is defective, it should 
instruct the sentencing court that any fine suspended to facilitate the payment of 
impermissible portions of the restitution order may be reinstated. It should further 
15 
clarify that a proper restitution order may include the value of two days' lost wages 
suffered by the victim while responding to police interviews, attending court 
proceedings, and addressing the stolen checks problem with his bank.5 
At sentencing, the trial judge imposed a $1000 fine and a $200 attorneys' fees 
recoupment. He then suspended the fine and the recoupment for the express 
purpose of facilitating defendant's payment of the restitution order. He suspended 
them on the assumption that defendant was "going to pay restitution in an amount 
greater than . . . those amounts." R. 70:13-14. "I suspended . . . the fine . . . . [in] 
anticipation of [defendant's] paying the $5000 restitution." R. 71:3. He reiterated 
to defendant: "[A]s a practical matter, it's going to be impossible for you to pay a 
fine as well as the restitution and it's more important that the restitution get paid." 
R. 71:13. 
If this court determines that the sentencing court erred in requiring restitution 
for losses occasioned by the theft of items not received, the restitution order will be 
reduced from $5090 to $440. Should the sentencing court reimpose the fine and 
recoupment fee, the court would require defendant to pay a total of $1660, far less 
than the original restitution order. 
5Defendant has conceded that she should be responsible for those stolen items she 
possessed when arrested. Br. Aplt. at 5. These included four rings, a pocket watch, and 
one or more stolen checks. The sentencing court may therefore appropriately require 
restitution for the cost of replacing stolen checks and repairing or replacing the rings and 
pocket watch, if damaged or unreturnable. 
16 
While defendants enjoy constitutional and statutory protections against harsher 
sentences after appeal, the sentencing court may, under the circumstances of this 
case, reinstate the fine and recoupment fee without infringing on defendant's rights 
because the resultant sentence would not be harsher than the original. 
Defendant's rights limiting what sentence may be imposed at resentencing are 
delineated in statute and case law. Section 76-3-405 of Utah Code Annotated 
precludes the imposition of a new sentence which is more severe than a prior 
sentence set aside on direct review. The Utah Supreme Court has also held that the 
new sentence may not be harsher than the original sentence: due process requires 
that a defendant "be free[] from the apprehension that if he appeals his conviction 
successfully . . . the trial judge can retaliate by giving him an increased sentence." 
State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179, 180 (Utah 1981). His Utah constitutional right to 
appeal requires that he bear no "risk that he may be penalized with a harsher 
sentence" for having successfully demonstrated some error below. Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citation omited). Further, one element of a sentence cannot be 
increased because another element is decreased where "the possibility of such a 
tradeoff could act as a deterrent to appeal by an individual defendant." Id. at 181. 
A court cannot, following a successful appeal, resentence the defendant to a longer 
term of incarceration but a smaller amount of restitution. Id. at 180. 
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In this case, however, reinstatement of the fine and recoupment would result 
in a sentence clearly and measurably less harsh than the original. Neither the term 
of incarceration nor the term of probation would change. Only defendant's financial 
obligation would change—and it would decrease by almost $3500. 
Furthermore, the judge here expressly suspended the fine and recoupment fee 
to facilitate defendant's payment of restitution. His reinstatement of the fine or 
recoupment fee at resentencing would not be retaliatory, but would only reflect the 
change in the victim's ability to pay occasioned by the substantial reduction in her 
restitution obligation. 
Finally, fairness dictates that defendant should not reap a "windfall" where the 
judge expressly suspended the fine and recoupment fee to help her pay the 
restitution ordered. If, at resentencing, the judge imposes restitution for only $1660, 
he should retain the discretion to reimpose the suspended fine and recoupment fee. 
The sentencing court may also require defendant to pay restitution for the two 
days' lost wages for time the victim spent with the police, in court, and at the bank. 
Defendant's receipt of the stolen jewelry and checks caused these losses. 
Oregon courts, construing the statute after which the Utah statute is patterned, 
have held that costs incurred by victims in responding to a crime can be included in 
a restitution order. See State v. Tuma, 637 P.2d 614, 615 (Or. 1981) (stating that 
defendant, who burglarized home while victim was traveling, could be required to 
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pay higher air fare or costs associated with forfeited prepaid lodging, if victim's 
early return was the result of criminal activity); State v. Lindsly, 808 P.2d 727, 729 
(Or. App. 1991) (holding that restitution order properly included investigative 
expenses incurred by victim in responding to defendant's unauthorized use of 
victim's equipment). 
In sum, should this court require resentencing, it should clarify that the trial 
judge may, in his discretion, reinstate the fine and fees suspended to permit payment 
of the restitution originally ordered. The court should also clarify that restitution 
may include all the costs incurred by the victim in responding to defendant's 
criminal activity. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. Should the court vacate the 
restitution order, it should delineate the appropriate scope of a subsequent restitution 
order and clarify that the sentencing court may reinstate any fine or fee suspended to 
facilitate payment of the restitution originally ordered. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on March^;, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
^ O c u ^ 
NNE B. INOUYE 
sistant Attorney General 
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76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sen-
tences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution 
— Hearing. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmen-
tal entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in 
Subsection (4)(c). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has 
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty, 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
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(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to 
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as 
defined in Subsection (l)(e). 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections 
(4)(c) and (4)(d). 
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of 
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in 
Subsection (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of 
the order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the 
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution 
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person 
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution 
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of 
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of 
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorne/s fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting 
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the 
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, 
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is 
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been 
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended 
by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4Xc). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to com-
pensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court hav-
ing criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the 
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be 
determined as provided in Subsection (8). 
58 
PUNISHMENTS 76-3-201 
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for 
the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, 
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been 
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim. 
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the 
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remain-
der of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the 
defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may. impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Sub-
section (5Xa)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported, 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to 
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants 
actually transported in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or 
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify impo-
sition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
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the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promul-
gated by the Sentencing Commission. 
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of 
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, 
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is 
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or 
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the 
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over 
any conflicting provision of law. 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A 
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or 
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage 
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services 
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, 
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with 
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabili-
tation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-
ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsec-
tion (8Kb) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an 
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and 
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order 
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of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to 
provide restitution to the victim. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-201; 1979, ch. 69, § 1; 
1981, ch. 59, § 1; 1983, ch. 85, § 1; 1983, ch. 
88, § 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1; 1986, ch. 156, § 1; 
1987, ch. 107, § 1; 1990, ch. 81, § 1; 1992, ch. 
142, § 1; 1993, ch. 17, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 19; 
1995, ch. I l l , § 1; 1995, ch. 117, § 1; 1995, 
ch. 301, § 1; 1995, ch. 337, § 1; 1995 (1st 
S.S.), ch. 10, § 1; 1996, ch. 40, § 1; 1996, ch. 
79, § 98; 1996, ch. 241, §§ 2, 3; 1998, ch. 149, 
§ 1; 1999, ch. 270, § 15. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment by ch. I l l , effective May 1, 1995, added 
"or for conduct for which the defendant has 
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement" and made a related change in Sub-
section (4Xa)(i). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 117, effective 
May 1, 1995, inserted "the accrual of interest 
from the time of sentencing" in Subsection 
(IXd), changed "person adjudged guilty" to "per-
son convicted" in Subsection (2), and added 
Subsections (4XaXiii) and (4Xd)(iii). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 301, effective 
May 1, 1995, added "and as further defined in 
Subsection (4Xc)" at the end of Subsection 
(IXd); rewrote Subsection (4) to revise the cri-
teria and procedures for ordering restitution; 
added Subsection (8); and made several stylis-
tic changes. 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 337, effective 
April 29, 1996, added Subsection (2Xg), redes-
ignated former Subsection (2Xg) as Subsection 
(2Xh), and deleted former Subsection (7Xc), 
requiring sentencing to the aggravated manda-
tory term in cases of substantial bodily injury to 
children during the commission of child kid-
napping or various listed child sexual assaults. 
The 1995 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective 
April 29, 1996, substituted "April 29, 1996" for 
"May 1, 1995" in Subsection (2Xg). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 40, effective 
April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsection 
(2Xg), which read: "on or after April 29, 1996, to 
imprisonment at not less than five years and 
which may be for life for an offense under Title 
76, Chapter 5, Part 4, and Sections 76-5-301.1 
and 76-5-302; or" and redesignated former Sub-
section (2)(h) as Subsection (2)(g); deleted 
former Subsection (7), relating to resentencing 
of a defendant subject to mandatory sentencing 
under Subsection (6); and added Subsection (7). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 79, effective 
April 29, 1996, in Subsection (2Kb) substituted 
"removal or disqualification from" for "removal 
from or disqualification of and in Subsection 
(4)(a)(i) added "Section" before "77-37-2." 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 241, §§ 2 and 3, 
effective April 29, 1996, added Subsections 
(4)(a)(vii) and (4)(d)(iv). 
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998. 
in Subsection (4Xa)(i) substituted "Subsection 
(l)(e)" for "Section 77-38-2" and deleted "and 
family member has the meaning as defined in 
Section 77-37-2" from the end and changed the 
style of the internal references in Subsections 
(5)(cXi), (5)(c)(ii), and (8Xc). 
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, 
in Subsection (6Xe), substituted "aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances" for "aggravation 
and mitigation" and "Sentencing Commission" 
for "Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Jus-
tice" and made stylistic changes. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1995, ch. 301, 
§ 6 provides that the amendments in ch. 117 to 
Subsection (4XaXiii) shall merge into this sec-
tion, as amended by ch. 301, as Subsection 
(4XaXvi). 
Laws 1995, ch. 337 was effective May 1,1995; 
however, § 76-3-201.3 postponed the amend-
ment of this section by ch. 337 until April 29, 
1996. 
Cross-References. — Commission on 
Criminal and Juvenile Justice, § 63-25a-101 et 
seq. 
Division of Finance, § 63A-3-101 et seq. 
Removal of officers, § 77-6-1 et seq. 
Restitution as condition of probation, § 77-
18-1. 
Sentence, judgment and commitment, Rule 
22, R.Crim.P. 
Special release from city or county jail, pur-
poses, conditions and limitations, § 77-19-3 et 
seq. 
Uniform misdemeanor fine/bail schedule, 
Code of Judicial Administration, Appx. C. 




—Bodily injury to victim. 
—Severity of offense. 
—Sufficient. 
Arrest record. 
—Effect on sentence. 
Credit for pretrial detention. 
Discretion of court. 
Effect of noncompliance. 
Informal procedure. 
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recipient or as to the nature or amount of the property, without takinj 
reasonable measures to return it to the owner; and 
(2) He has the purpose to deprive the owner of the property when hi 
obtains the property or at any time prior to taking the measures desig 
nated in paragraph (1). 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-407, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-407. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny C.J.S. — 52AC.J.S. Larceny § 18. 
§ 111 et seq. 
76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbro 
kers. 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the propert] 
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably hai 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, oi 
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen 
intending to deprive the owner of it. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in th< 
case of an actor who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on z 
separate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the 
receiving offense charged; 
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed, 
acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable 
value; or 
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker oi 
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used oi 
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, oi 
representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains 
property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to: 
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the 
property; 
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the 
bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and 
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identifica-
tion. 
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in 
or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every 
agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to 
comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be presumed to have 
bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or 
unlawfully obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof. 
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence 
that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a 
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal 
property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or 
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person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed, or withheld the 
property without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2)(d), then 
the burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property bought, 
received, or obtained was not stolen. 
(5) Subsections (2)(d), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as 
defined in Section 76-10-901. 
(6) As used in this section: 
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on 
the security of the property; 
(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-408, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-408; 1979, ch. 71, § 1; 
1993, ch. 102, § 1. 
Cross-References. — Pawnbrokers and sec-
ondhand dealers, § 11-6-1 et seq. 





—Concealing stolen property. 









The presumption created in Subsection (2) is 
constitutional when read in light of § 76-1-503, 
which provides that a presumption means only 
that the issue of the presumed fact must be 
submitted to the jury unless its existence is 
clearly negated and that the jury may treat 
proof of the underlying facts as evidence of the 
presumed fact, but does not disturb the require-
ment that the presumed fact, like all other 
elements of the crime, must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Mullins, 549 P.2d 454 
(Utah 1976). 
The phrase "believing that it probably has 
been stolen" in Subsection (1), while not a 
model of draftsmanship, is not unconstitution-
ally vague. State v. Plum, 552 P.2d 124 (Utah 
1976). 
Applicability. 
The plain meaning of Subsection (2Xd) limits 
its application to pawnbrokers and similar 
businesses that generally deal in small pur-
chases of secondhand consumer goods. It does 
not include businesses that regularly deal in 
large bulk orders of raw industrial material. 
Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 
1993). 
Elements. 
—Concealing stolen property. 
The elements in the crime of concealing or 
aiding in the concealment of stolen property 
are: (1) property belonging to another has been 
stolen; (2) the defendant aided in concealing 
this property; (3) at the time he so aided in 
concealing it he knew the item had been stolen; 
and (4) his purpose in acting was to deprive the 
owner thereof of possession. State v. Lamm, 606 
P.2d 229 (Utah 1980). 
—Receiving stolen property. 
Elements of the crime of receiving stolen 
property are: property belonging to another has 
been stolen; the defendant received, retained or 
disposed of the stolen property; at the time of 
receiving, retaining or disposing of the property 
the defendant knew or believed the property 
was stolen; and the defendant acted purposely 
to deprive the owner of the possession of the 
property. State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399 (Utah 
1980). 
Time of the alleged offense is not an essential 
element of the crime of receiving stolen prop-
erty; state's proof that offense occurred on a 
date different than that alleged in the informa-
tion was not fatal to defendant's conviction for 
receiving stolen property where the applicable 
limitations statute had not run at the time the 
charge was filed. State v. Wilson, 642 P.2d 394 
(Utah 1982). 
In order to obtain a conviction for theft by 
receiving, the state must prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt each of the following elements: 
(1) The defendant received, retained, or dis-
posed of the property of another, (2) knowing 
that the property had been stolen or believing 
that it probably had been stolen, (3) with the 
purpose to deprive the owner thereof. State v. 
Hill, 727 P.2d 221 (Utah 1986). 
Entrapment* 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: What do you have ready to go, you 
guys? 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Well, cold we call Tara Mast? 
THE COURT: If that would put a smile on both 
your face and that of Ms. Parkinson, I will do it. You're 
both far too pleasant to be professional barristers—and 
I'm glad. I don't want you to change. 
Now, how are you? 
MS. PARKINSON: I'm fine. 
THE COURT: Good. That was one of the nicest 
kind of a skulking into court, that was wonderful. 
(Inaudible) 
THE COURT: I know you were out, working. No 
problem at all. (Inaudible) 
MS. PARKINSON: I—and I forgot my jacket today 
and I apologize. 
THE COURT: Yes, and you look very professional, 
there's no problem. 
(Inaudible) 
THE COURT: Now, this is Tara Kay Mast standing 
next to you, Mr. Eldridge? 
MR. ELDRIDGE: That's correct. She was supposed 
to be here last Monday for sentencing. 
2 
1 THE COURT: And didn't show. 
2 MR. ELDRIDGE: Was not here and she's being held 
3 in the jail until (inaudible) fit the schedule. 
4 THE COURT: Here for sentencing. She didn't show 
5 up for pre-sentence report either. I wonder how come. 
6 MR. ELDRIDGE: There was a pre-sentence report 
7 prepared. 
8 THE COURT: They told me she didn't show up for 
9 it. 
10 MR. ELDRIDGE: I have one* 
11 THE COURT: From A P & P? 
12 I MR. ELDRIDGE: Yeah. 
13 THE COURT: Well, what are they recommending? 
14 MR. ELDRIDGE: They're recommending six months in 
15 the jail, restitution, $200 recoupment, successfully 
16 complete drug court program, (inaudible) probation— 
17 THE COURT: Well, so they're recommending I stay 
18 a commitment to prison then; is that right? 
19 Ms. Wissler, do you feel comfortable standing in, 
20 being the seasoned prosecutor you are, if I—if I can just 
21 take a moment to peruse the pre-sentence report, I may be 
22 willing to go ahead and follow that* Would you like me to 
23 do that, Mr. Eldridge and Ms. Mast, and get you on your 
24 way? 
25 THE COURT: It sounds to me like it's favorable 
if they're recommending the prison sentence is—is stayed. 
I—I—you know, you may want to strike while the iron is 
hot. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Would you like to look at this? 
THE COURT: Yeah. If you—if you want to be 
sentenced today. 
It just seems to me it would be pretty hard to be 
in a better position if we send it back to A P & P and ask 
them for an update and you know, based—with the additional 
little deal with the—with the no show. 
You met Curtis Belnap at Odyssey House? 
MS. MAST: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is that right? 
MS. MAST: Uh huh. 
THE COURT: Did you not like him or what? 
MS. MAST: I liked him. 
THE COURT: Huh? 
MS. MAST: No, I liked him. 
THE COURT: Who actually did the burglary at 
Belnap's home, do you know? 
MS* MAST: I don't know. It~I don't know. It 
wasn't me, I was not up there. 
THE COURT: And it just happened that the checks 
you were given just happened to be somebody that you were 
at the Odyssey House with? All those that believe that, 
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1 raise your hand. No hands are being raised. 
2 Well, let me say this, I'm surprised they're not 
3 recommending a prison commitment. Mr. Eldridge, I don't 
4 know what you were expecting, given her criminal history, 
5 but they're the experts. I'M wiling to follow the 
6 recommendation of A P & P. I suppose the drug court 
7 program is the—is the deal. 
8 Ms. Mast, I will say this, I have had higher 
9 comfort levels than I'm feeling right now about you 
10 succeeding in probation. That's not to say we don't want 
11 you to, the reverse is true, we want you to succeed; but 
12 please understand that if (inaudible) sentence here today, 
13 the sentence would be the Utah State Prison and you'll have 
14 to earn your way out of that by completing drug court, 
15 serving your six months and completing probation. 
16 If you violate by either re-offending, getting 
17 involved in drug usage again and burglaries, forgeries or 
18 whatever or if you simply aren't compliant with the 
19 treatment, then if I see you again, it'll be simply to 
20 impose the prison sentence. 
21 The truth of it is, there are occasionally people 
22 that we stay a commitment to prison for, that because of 
23 very limited criminal history and maybe some other reasons, 
24 who maybe do a false step or two and not have the prison 
25 imposed; you would not be that. I mean, I think you're 
just obviously out, by the skin of your teeth, and I would 
want to reinforce for you that you'll want to do everything 
you possibly can to make sure you comply with probation. 
Mr. Eldridge, do you want to go ahead and have 
her be sentenced today then, follow the pre-sentence 
report? 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Judge, I—I think that that would 
be okay. We'd just like to—to mention a couple of things. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: First of all, Judge, although 
there is a criminal history here, there is a significant 
(inaudible) gap in there. She successfully went through 
Odyssey House, stayed out of trouble for the last ten years 
and just recently fell back (inaudible) caused her 
problems* And I think that may be part of the basis for 
what the recommendation is, because she did do well before 
and Odyssey House did make a difference and (inaudible) 
Second of all, we'd just like to make the Court 
aware that the drug court program, I don't believe it's the 
drug court here, I believe it's the drug court through 
Taylorsville—Taylorsville Justice Court, as I understand 
it, city court. So, it would be a misdemeanor-type drug 
court, although they're going to provide some supervision 
and keep track on that, and as well A P & P would—would be 
supervising that as well* 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: But (inaudible) what she needs is 
the structure, she's got the tools, she knows how to 
address these problems, she just needs that structure of 
someone— 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: —basically having to report in 
and check in with someone to just give her the—to help 
her. 
THE COURT: I understand. Thank you, Mr. 
Eldridge. 
Ms. Wissler, anything to say? 
MS. WISSLER: No, your Honor, we'll submit it on 
the pre-sentence report. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
And anything else in your own behalf, Ms. Mast? 
MS. MAST: 'No. 
THE COURT: It will be the judgment of the Court 
in this matter that you be ordered committed to the Utah 
State Prison for an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years as provided by law. At this time, I will stay the 
execution of the prison sentence. 
Place you on probation with Adult Probation & 
Parole for 36 months with the following conditions: 
First condition is a six-month commitment to the 
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1 Salt Lake County Jail, giving you credit for time served 
2 and ordering that to run concurrently. 
3 You are obligated and ordered at this time to pay 
4 restitution in the amount that is set forth in the pre-
5 sentence report at a monthly rate to be determined. That 
6 can be (inaudible) 
7 MR. ELDRIDGE: Judge, if we can just—under the 
8 restitution, I don't be—I think that the reason why they 
9 put that in there, there was where she passed a check, 
10 there was no—she didn't get anything for it. 
11 THE COURT: Uh huh. 
12 I MR. ELDRIDGE: She had some rings that were taken 
13 in that burglary, apparently, and the restitution amount 
14 there (inaudible) other items that were taken in the 
15 burglary. 
16 THE COURT: Yeah. Yeah. I gave her a chance to 
17 tell me about the burglary and she declined to do that, and 
18 I'm convinced to a civil standard, which that—if you want 
19 to request a restitution hearing, you can sure do that. 
20 MR. ELDRIDGE: Well, I — I — 
21 THE COURT: But we're going to have to 
22 (inaudible) that, too; so, you might want to talk with her 
23 enough to kick that scab off or not. 
24 MR. ELDRIDGE: I ~ 
25 THE COURT: I gave her a chance to just 
8 
voluntarily talk about it and she didn't want to do that. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Well, she told you what she knew 
and— 
THE COURT: I told her what I thought about that, 
too. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Judge, I just don't—that's not 
related to this case, that's a completely separate thing, 
the burglary, that she's not charged with that here, she 
hasn't pled to that. The—the (inaudible) the burglary and 
I don't—I don't believe— 
THE COURT: Okay. Then I think—let's do a 
restitution hearing then. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Okay. 
THE COURT: If—I'm going to go ahead and order a 
restitution amount of $5,090 and you can notice that up and 
we'll have her--
MR. ELDRIDGE: Could we just go ahead and set 
that today for a restitution hearing? 
MS. WISSLER: Jared, could you—could you just 
get with the prosecutor that's assigned to this case and 
set a date for that? 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Okay. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Let me just be real clear with 
you, Ms. Mast, and that is, I'm not going to play word 
games with you, you know and this stuff like, some friend 
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gave me a check and I don't remember and that kind of 
stuff, I mean, I have no interest in placing you on 
probation, period, with that kind of attitude. 
You know, if—if—again, if—this is a rather 
whimsical story, frankly, that it—that someone happens to 
do a burglary in a community of, what, there's a million 
and a half people in this valley and it just happens to be 
someone in Odyssey House. 
You know, if—I suppose it just sort of could 
happen but the more whimsical it becomes, and some guy 
named Fred, I don't know his last name, and that kind of 
stuff, I suppose, you know, if you're interested in telling 
us everything you know about the burglary, who gave you the 
checks and that sort of thing, we can sure--I can sure do 
that. 
Do you want to talk to Mr. Eldridge before we set 
that up or what do you want to do? 
MS. MAST: Yeah. 
THE COURT: You're telling me you don't know who 
did the burglary; is that right? 
MS. MAST: I don't know, no. I don't know. I 
wasn't involved in the burglary. The people and I wrote in 
the pre-sentence report, the—you know the guy that came 
and got me and actually, I thought it was this chick but I 
(inaudible) and— 
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THE COURT: And you didn't recognize the name 
Curtis Belnap on the check? 
MS. MAST: Not until—as soon as I looked down, 
passing it, then I recognized that I knew and those—and 
then I—yeah, I understood what was going on; but I—no, I 
was not involved in that burglary. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me say this to you 
then. I think we need to have these friends of your ex-
boyfriend brought in and we need—you need to I.D. them and 
you need—we need to prosecute them, don't you think? 
I mean, frankly, I mean, that's the first rule of 
folklore. It starts with friends of a friend. The first 
line of your statement is, friends of—this is even worse— 
friends of my ex-boyfriend. Right. You know, and of 
course, you don't know who they are and that kind of stuff, 
you know, for someone who's asking not to be placed in 
prison, I don't think it's just a good idea to tell those 
kinds of things, that we euphemistically call folklore. 
So, it just seems to me that—again, you can 
make—take the choice, you can be jointly and severally 
liable for the amounts of restitution or if you want to 
hold a restitution hearing, then let's divulge all the 
information. And--
Why, are you just afraid of these people or what? 
MS. MAST: No, I just—I don't know who it is. I 
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1 mean, I— 
2 THE COURT: It's an every day occurrence, people 
3 just gave you stolen checks and you don't know who they 
4 are, but you happen to know the victim. I mean, think of 
5 how implausible that is, people you don't know, you don't 
6 know their names, are going to give you stolen checks, just 
7 for the fun of it, and it turns out that the victim on the 
8 stolen check, you were in Odyssey House with. Does—does 
9 that even sound plausible to you? 
10 MS. MAST: It—it's pretty far-fetched, yeah. 
11 THE COURT: Yeah, I agree. That's a good way of 
12 putting it. Yeah. And at this point, you're still drawing 
13 a blank on who the people were that—that committed the 
14 burglary, that gave you the stolen checks; is that right? 
15 MS. MAST: I honestly don't know who it was, I 
16 don't—I couldn't name them, I could not. 
17 THE COURT: Who's your ex-boyfriend? 
18 MS. MAST: His name's Braden, but he had nothing 
19 to do with this, he (inaudible) he had absolutely nothing 
20 to do with this. 
21 THE COURT: Yeah. See, that's interesting, that-
22 -I wish we would have had this conversation before I 
23 pronounced sentence, Mr. Eldridge. See, she's so far away 
24 from—this of the incongruity of that, Ms. Mast, for just a 
25 moment. You don't know who did the burglary but yet you're 
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willing to tell me that your ex-boyfriend didn't do it. 
So— 
MS. MAST: And he didn't—he wasn't around— 
THE COURT: How do you know that? If you don't 
know who did it, then you wouldn't know that he didn't do 
it. 
MS. MAST: Well, okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, you want to be big, tough 
and take—you know, and show people, so go do it. 
MS. MAST: I'm not being—I'm not trying to be 
big and tough and show anybody nothing. I—I don't know. 
THE COURT: Well, I'll use your word back, far-
fetched. 
Okay. Well, talk to your client, Mr. Eldridge, 
and if you want it set for a restitution hearing, we can 
certainly do that if that's what you decide to do. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Okay. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. It'll be the judgment of the 
Court then, the prison sentence is stayed six—36 months' 
probation, six months in the county jail, ordered to pay 
restitution, jointly and severally. And I'm going to 
impose a $1,000 fine and a $200 attorney's fees recoupment. 
I will stay the—and suspend the payment of the 
fine and the payment of the attorney's fees recoupment, 
assuming that she's going to pay restitution in an amount 
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greater than—than those amounts. 
You'll need to main—successfully complete the 
drug court program, maintain full-time, verifiable 
employment, do not use drugs or alcohol while on probation. 
MS. MAST: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Ms. Mast, you'll have to undergo 
random periodic urine screens and submit to chemical 
testing at the request of your probation officer. 
Please understand, Ms. Mast, you're not even to 
frequent places or be with people that are using illicit 
drugs. You can't go in places where drugs are being used. 
And I want you to stay out of taverns and bars, or places 
where alcohol is a cheap item to order. 
Comply fully with your probation and you'll not 
have to—you'll not be committed to the Utah State Prison. 
At some point in time while on probation, if you 
decide—if you either glean information or suddenly have a 
better recollection and you think it would be fair if 
someone shared in the restitution and you could certainly 
provide those names to your probation officer; but unless 
and until we order otherwise, of course, you'd be liable 
for the restitution. 
Mr. Eldridge, I affirmatively again so there's no 
misunderstanding, I will clear the fine and as well as the 
attorney's fee recoupment in light of the fact that—and at 
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1 some level I suppose one could say that it's unfair that 
2 she's paying restitution for folks that—because she can't 
3 remember their names. So, I'll at least help her to that 
4 regard and that's the best I can do for her today. 
5 Thank you, (inaudible) it was nice to see you. 
6 So, what else do you have, Mr. Eldridge? 
7 MR. ELDRIDGE: That's it. 
8 | (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
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THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Eldridge? 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Your Honor, I'm here on the Tara 
Mast matter. She#s in custody. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: I'm not sure exactly what we—how 
we are going to proceed (inaudible) I'm not sure if the 
State has— 
THE COURT: Did you bring a file, Ms. Bernards-
Goodman? 
MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN: What? 
THE COURT: Did you bring a file? 
MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN: Yes. I have the file but 
I didn't know we had a motion hearing today. 
THE COURT: This cuts to the issue of the 
restitution and Mr. Eldridge's position is that Ms. Mast 
should be responsible only for the portion of the 
restitution having to do with the specific items that she 
was convicted of, in terms of the theft by receiving. 
And the value of the ring of $1,000 and your 
claim is that the other items taken in the burglary, she 
should not be responsible for, only those items for which 
she entered a plea. 
And—and let me say this, I—I think that that's 
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generally right with the exception that, if I had some 
information, I guess, Mr. Eldridge, that in fact Ms. Mast's 
involvement is limited to simply receiving those rings that 
were—which she was found—when I—at the time of 
sentencing, we gave Ms. Mast an opportunity to talk about 
that and frankly, I wasn't overly impressed with the view— 
with her view of what occurred. And I don't have the 
benefit of full police reports, but that's kind of where we 
are. 
I also should indicate that I suspended—was it 
$1,000 for the fine? 
MR. ELDRIDGE: I believe so. 
THE COURT: Yeah. In anticipation of paying the 
$5,000 in restitution and I suppose if I understand your 
position correctly, Mr. Eldridge, that is that the 
restitution should be amended down to $1,000 and that then 
she would simply pay the $1,000 fine and the $1,000 
restitution and it looks like attorney recoupment of $200 
and be excused from paying the other $4,000 of restitution. 
I guess that's a $3,000 plus-up for her and certainly if 
that's the fair, right thing to do, I'm willing to do that; 
but if she is a—a party to the underlying offense, I—I 
guess I'm just not going to—you know, the fact that she— 
well, it—it seems—I'm just not convinced at all that she 
has no involvement or knowledge of the burglary whatsoever. 
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1 Ms. Bernards-Goodman, what's your position on 
2 this? 
3 MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN: Well, your Honor, I do 
4 note that the burglary occurred that very same day— 
5 THE COURT: Yeah. 
6 MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN: —which—which gives me a 
7 presumption that even though she may not be the person who 
8 goes over and commits the burglary, she's right there when 
9 they come back, obviously. 
10 And—and I know this may be a little outside the 
11 norm, but it's my feeling that the Court is too generous 
12 when it comes to restitution concerns on behalf of the 
13 defendant. It's—my feeling is that if you're going to get 
14 yourself involved in things like possession of stolen— 
15 possession of stolen property, then you open yourself up to 
16 the concerns of restitution for whatever may have been 
17 taken, along with that stolen property. 
18 I So many times, we have people come in here and 
19 they only want to be responsible for, you know, when ten 
20 people were kicking on a car, they only want to pay for the 
21 one dent they made, rather than everything that happened in 
22 that criminal episode. 
23 For someone to be involved as part of an ongoing 
24 criminal episode and it's happening pretty quick and by 
25 possessing that stolen property, she leaves herself open to 
all the losses of that victim, no matter how they occurred 
in that vein, they occurred. The victim should not be a 
person who ends up short-changed here, 
THE COURT: And I guess the one other factor, and 
again, I just want Mr, Eldridge to respond, again, your 
very thoughtful and your—your motion's very well written, 
your arguments before were good; you know, if there were— 
if it were the kind of fact type of burglary that occurred 
six months before and there was any plausible explanation 
as to how she got this, other than with full knowledge of 
the burglary occurring and—it would be a different thing; 
but it was the absolute, you know, immediacy. 
And not only do we have the ring--the rings, I 
guess, and the watch, but the forgery involves checks taken 
in that same burglary and it is so—I guess what I'm 
saying, Ms. Mast, to you and to you through your attorney 
is, I'm certainly not going to take at face value simply 
your self-serving declaration to A P & P in its report, 
that I knew nothing about the theft and burglary, but 
somehow magically and mystically, literally within hours of 
the burglary, you have a check—you have checks, a watch 
and rings taken in the burglary and yet, know nothing about 
a burglary. 
And that just doesn't even pass the basic smell 
test. So, I think I invited you before to share candid 
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information regarding—about the burglary, then if—you 
know, if in fact, you don't know about it, you know, how is 
that even possible? 
So, I just see a couple of options at this point. 
Number one, I—I understand that there—that you aren't 
comfortable about the restitution because there are unnamed 
people who profited from him and you're kinda getting 
blocked for the whole thing. I understand how you feel 
about that and that's frankly the reason that I ordered the 
$1,000 of the fine suspended, you know, to—to put some—in 
one sense, trying to level that. 
But—and certainly, I can deny the motion and 
the—and the sentence can stand and I guess Mr. Eldridge 
can do what he wants to with the Court of Appeals if he 
thinks that's an abuse of discretion. 
Number two, I don't have a problem with 
continuing this and allowing you to speak with either law 
enforcement officials or A P & P representatives, if you— 
if there is information that you (A) have, and (B) want to 
disclose regarding the burglary and allowing others to be 
brought to justice who either participated in or in fact 
have the items; or (C) we can schedule a—an evidentiary 
hearing. 
And I don't disagree with—violently with the law 
stated by Mr. Eldridge, just to say this, if there is an 
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1 absence of information, if all the evidentiary hearing is 
2 going to show is that there was a burglary and within— 
3 literally within hours of that burglary, you have a 
4 checkbook, rings and a watch that were taken in the 
5 burglary and there's some other missing items, and if there 
6 is no information either from the defense or from the State 
7 as to how the burglary was convicted—was committed, who 
8 else was involved in it, I can tell you right now, I'm not 
9 going to change the order and I'm going to leave the 
10 restitution at $5,000. 
11 If the Court of Appeals wants to take a different 
12 view of that, they can; but I think that Ms, Bernards-
13 Goodman certainly expresses the in—legislative intent with 
14 respect to victims' rights legislation and I think what the 
15 Court ought to do in absence of—of evidence otherwise. 
16 I think there is some inferential—you do not 
17 have the burden of proof, but I would say this, in the ab— 
18 given the facts of this case, the very close proximity in 
19 time and the absence of other information, this is a civil 
20 standard, after all, not a criminal standard, beyond a 
21 reasonable doubt. 
22 And my finding of fact is, I'm convinced at this 
23 point, the information, by a simple preponderance of the 
24 evidence, that Ms. Mast had knowledge of the burglary and 
25 participated as a—and theft, as a party to that offense. 
Mr. Eldridge, what—what—do you have any—you're 
welcome to have the benefit of the record, to make any 
record you'd like to or argument or suggestion you want to 
make today, sir. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Well, your Honor, I guess our 
position is, is that looking at the restitution—the 
restitution statutes under, I guess 76-3-201— 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: —Subsection (4) and I guess 
that's really Sub (A) Sub (i), it indicates that 
restitution shall be ordered for pecuniary damages that 
result from a criminal activity that the defendant has been 
convicted of or has agreed to make restitution as part of a 
plea agreement. 
The—the statute also describes or defines 
criminal activities as any offense for which the defendant 
is convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the 
defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court 
with or without an admission of committing the criminal 
conduct itself. 
So, our position is, is Ms. Mast has not been 
convicted of burglary, she's not admitted or agreed as part 
of a plea bargain to pay restitution for items taken in the 
burglary. She's never even admitted responsibility for the 
burglary and therefore, under this statute, I think that 
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1 she can't be ordered to pay the restitution for items taken 
2 in the burglary* 
3 She can certainly be ordered to pay restitution 
4 for any sort of pecuniary loss that stems—her criminal 
5 activity for which she pled guilty to and which she admits 
6 responsibility for, which would be the theft by receiving, 
7 of which the rings were recovered, unless there's some sort 
8 of damage to the rings. I think that restitution has been 
9 made on that already. And—and that's restitution that she 
10 ought to be rightfully held to and that's, I think, what 
11 serves the interest of justice here. 
12 And that's—that's basically our position, your 
13 Honor. 
14 MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN: And I don't think what the 
15 Court has ordered is outside that statute. She has been 
16 charged with and admitted receiving stolen property. This 
17 is part of the property, the property is a package as a 
18 whole and she's got part of it, she should get to pay for 
19 all of it. 
20 MR. ELDRIDGE: Your Honor, I—I would just add 
21 also, I think ordering her to pay restitution for items 
22 taken in a burglary also infringes upon her right to due 
23 process. She's never been charged with that burglary, 
24 that's never been an issue, that's never been litigated, 
25 it's never been through court, she's never had an 
opportunity to—to really respond to that in the sense of 
litigation. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Actually, that's well said. 
Let me say this and again, I'm not suggesting for a moment 
the State under-charged the case or should have charged a 
burglary. There's absolutely no way they could prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that she committed the burglary, 
they can't put her at the crime scene, either. She's 
presumed innocent. There is no plausible way that she 
should be charged with the burglary; but again, let me just 
focus on the specific facts of this case and the utterances 
made by Ms. Mast. 
And again, if she wants to be sworn in, put under 
oath, we'll let her do it if she wants to—to change any 
statement that she's made, but this is the information upon 
which I need to make a ruling, and that is again, (A) that 
she attempts to pass a forged check which was taken in a 
residential burglary in a very close time to the—to the 
incident of the passing of the check; that she is 
disingenuous, if not dishonest, at the time of the 
apprehension and initially stated that the rings and gold 
pocket watch belonged to her. 
So, I guess what I'm saying is, I have a person 
who apparently, not only has a—doesn't have a problem in 
passing forged checks, but in also misrepresenting and 
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being disingenuous, if not just flat-out—flat-out 
untruthful. 
And as it turns out, not only were the checks 
taken in a residential burglary, but the four men's rings, 
and again, this isn't like something for her personal use. 
I don't presume that she's going to personally wear four 
men's rings, but—and a gold pocket watch. And so I—I 
think it's just critical to note that Ms. Mast is, at this 
point, the recipient of items that were recently taken in a 
residential burglary and I think a fair inference, again to 
a civil standard, is, those items are being held for 
disposition, not for use. 
And then, following a Miranda warning, Ms. Mast 
makes the statement that an unnamed male friend gave her 
the checks and the jewelry. And that this male friend, 
however, is unknown; he's such a good friend that he'll 
give her jewelry items and she'll take them, but that she 
can't even remember his name or can she provide a 
description of him. 
In my view, that is—again, not that it's proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt or (inaudible) more into that, 
that, in my view, clearly meets a civil standard of 
demonstrating her involvement in—in a theft. And that it 
is so farcical and whimsical to believe for a moment that 
someone that she doesn't even know well enough to know his 
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name and can't even describe him is just for the fun of it, 
going to give him (sic) valuable items of jewelry. It—it 
is just—could it happen? Sure. Is it proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt? Absolutely not. 
But that being said, it seems to me that it is— 
clearly meets any evidentiary burden that the State would 
have in terms of a—of demonstrating Ms. Mast's involvement 
in a, quote, criminal activity under the terms of the 
statute. 
And I think it's also interesting that the 
statute doesn't talk about the criminal offense for which 
she entered the plea, but the criminal activity. 
And so the burden, it seems to me, is that as the 
finder of fact and sentencing judge in this matter, Mr. 
Eldridge, and Ms. Bernards-Goodman, is that should I go 
beyond the specific offense for which she was convicted, 
i.e., the theft by receiving? 
I think the answer is yes, but only if there is 
to at least a civil standard, a showing that the—of the 
criminal activity, part of which was the specific offense 
for which she was convicted. 
She was convicted of theft by receiving growing 
out of items taken in a theft and residential burglary. 
There, it seems to me, is such a close nexus in terms of 
time and there is such a insufficient explanation for how 
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she acquired these items and it appears on the face of it 
to be just simply unreasonable and unbelievable, frankly. 
And Ms, Mast's refusal to provide any additional 
information on which I could—I could base any other 
ruling, I'll find that the State through the pre-sentence 
report in fact has established to a sufficient civil 
standard, the—Ms. Mast's participation in a criminal 
activity resulting in an economic loss, as previously 
ordered by this Court. 
That's a long way of saying, Mr. Eldridge, that 
I'm, at this time, denying the motion to alter or amend the 
judgment and ordering that Ms. Mast's prior sentence 
wherein she was placed on probation to A P & P and ordered 
to be responsible for restitution as outlined still stands. 
And again, the fine is suspended in its entirety 
for the reason that I think it's—as a practical matter, 
it's going to be impossible for you to pay a fine as well 
as the restitution and it's more important that the 
restitution get paid as a priority. 
So I'm clearing the fine in its entirety and 
ordering that she pay the restitution as ordered by 
A P & P. 
Let me ask one other question. It wasn't clear 
to me from the pre-sentence report, didn't homeowners' 
insurance pick up and pay for part of that? 
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MR, ELDRIDGE: I don't remember. 
THE COURT: Do you know? 'Cause let me say, you 
know, the truth of it is, a judge can order all he or she 
wants, but it's not going to happen if it doesn't happen. 
It reminds me of the daylight savings, we can 
change our watches, we don't change the sun, do we? 
And I'm not sure that I can order that Ms. Mast 
acquire $5,000. That's not to say that she's not legally 
responsible for it. 
I would have no objection, Mr. Eldridge and Ms. 
Mackey (sic) if what she actually pays is the homeowner 
deductible and make that a condition of criminal probation, 
if that's not paid, it's revoked and she goes to jail. 
And the portion that is essentially an insurance 
subrogation claim be—pursuant to statute, be docketed as a 
civil judgment. Again, I'm not ordering that, I'm just 
saying that perhaps A P & P should look at that when Ms. 
Mast is released from custody and see where—what her 
earning capacity is. 
And if it is simply beyond her ability to pay the 
$5,000, which I'm going to guess that it may well be, you 
know, there may be a $500 insurance deductible that we need 
to, for sure, collect in cash, pay it on to the home owner 
and then, by law, the insurance company is entitled to be 
treated as a victim and is entitled to have a civil 
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judgment. 
And I'm not certain that absent a showing of her 
ability to do it, that we can enforce that, the actual 
payment of a—I think we can't turn the jail into debtor's 
prison, I guess is what I'm saying. And oftentimes, the 
payment of the deductible and the conversion to a civil 
judgment is the right way to handle those. 
The insurance company gets the benefit, not—not 
having to hire a lawyer, don't have to do the subrogation 
claim and they get their judgment and if Ms. Mast can pay 
it, eventually—ultimately, during the eight years while 
that judgment is extant, then she does and if not, she 
doesn't. 
But I just throw that open, that that might be a 
practical resolution. I think it would be unfortunate in— 
in these or other similar type cases that we exalt the 
reimbursement to insurance companies at such a high level 
that it takes precedent over drug rehab or other kinds of 
things that are probably of more directly interest to 
A P & P. 
And so what I'm saying, Ms. Mackey, if you want 
to convert that portion to a civil judgment, then you can 
certainly do that. 
MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN: Okay, your Honor, I'll 
make a note of that. 
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THE COURT: okay. If they want to and I'm not 
ordering it, that's just an option, and if you— 
MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN: Okay. 
THE COURT: —agree to, that's fine. 
Mr. Eldridge, what else, sir? 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Judge, as long as we're here, it's 
kind of on an unrelated issue with respect to Ms. Mast. 
Part of her sentence was, she was given credit for time 
served. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: The jail has only given her credit 
for about a week. 
THE COURT: I just put the pre-sentence report 
away. How long would she serve? 
MR* ELDRIDGE: The pre-sentence report indicates 
62 days. 
THE COURT: Okay. We can notify the jail that 
the commitment is to include 60—whatever the pre-sentence 
says is what I'm going to validate• Okay? 
MR. ELDRIDGE: It's right here. 
THE COURT: That works, doesn't it? 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Yes. That would be—that would be 
great, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. We'll do that. 
Now, Ms. Mast, I hope you'll look forward. You--
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1 A P & P wants to work with you, I suspended the prison 
2 sentence. I—I think you need to just throw your heart and 
3 soul into when you're released from custody, comply and get 
4 the help you need to get out of the circumstance that you 
5 were in. 
6 You know, I'm not exactly sure what's motivating 
7 you to protect those that beguiled you and got you into 
8 this situation, but maybe part of it's out of fear, or 
9 whatever; but in any event, I'm not compelling you, not 
10 ordering you to disclose who did the burglary. You've made 
11 your choices in that regard. You just need to put it 
12 behind you, you need to comply fully with A P & P, get in 
13 those treatment programs, get the help you need* 
14 I hope that it can be worked out so you're only 
15 paying the out-of-pocket deductible and I think that's 
16 going to make your life work out okay. All right? Thanks. 
17 MS. MAST: Thank you. 
18 THE COURT: Thanks, Mr. Eldridge. 
19 MR. ELDRIDGE: Thanks. 
20 J (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
21 
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